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THE FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: A PROPOSAL
FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE AND MORE EFFICIENT
RELATIONSHIP

LeRoy C . Paddock**

Before 1970, the responsibility for environmental enforcement
had been the nearly exclusive domain of state and local governments.' However, beginning with the passage of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 19702and continuing through the enactment of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act3 in 1980, the federal enforcement role and federal influence over state enforcement programs dramatically expanded. By
the mid-1980's the federal government had assumed the dominant
role in the enforcement of environmental lawe4Not only did this
change in the traditional~rolesof the state and federal governments
occur very rapidly, but it also occurred without a consistent set of
principles controlling the appropriate role of state governments
versus the federal government. Instead, the increasing federal
domination of environmental enforcement programs of this era
* B.A., American University 1965; J.D., University of Minnesota 1969. Mr. Humphrey was elected attorney general in 1982 and re-elected in 1986.
** B.A., University of Minnesota 1970; J.D., University of Iowa 1977. Mr. Paddock
was appointed special assistant attorney general in 1978 and assistant attorney general in
1987.
1. Federal involvement in environmental programs began with the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425,30 Stat. 1121 (1899). Additional federal legislation
was enacted in the 1950's and 1960's, but the scope of this legislation was relatively limited.
See 1 F. GRAD,TREATISE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW§ 1.01, at 1-6 (1989).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-604,84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $0 7401-7642
(1982)).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $0 9601-9675
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
4. See 1 F. GRAD,supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-19.
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appeared to be a reaction to the slow response of state governments in dealing with emerging environmental problem^.^
An equally dramatic shift in enforcement responsibilities is
evident in newer environmental programs such as the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act6 and the Medical
Waste Tracking Act of 1988' where the major enforcement responsibilities have been directly assigned to the states with little
federal involvement. Here, too, the allocation of enforcement responsibilities lacks any principled determination of the appropriate
roles of the federal and the state governments. Rather, the allocation of responsibilities under these laws appears to be based
largely on factors such as the lack of federal resources and the
expanding number of regulated entities.
Nearly twenty years have elapsed since the passage of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. This period has permitted
experimentation with a variety of approaches to environmental
enforcement. It has also produced significant tensions between the
states and the federal government, and enforcement programs
which, in many cases, do not produce optimal results. At least
part of the reason for these problems has been the absence of a
clear understanding of the appropriate roles of the states and the
federal government in environmental enforcement.
To allow the federal and state governments to work together
better, to best utilize the limited resources available for enforcement, to minimize duplication of effort, and to help meet the
rapidly expanding enforcement responsibilities of both states and
the federal government, a clear set of principles for allocating
enforcement responsibilities must be developed and utilized by
Congress, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") and the states. These principles should include the
following:
1. States should adopt their own regulatory and enforcement authority to support federal regulatory programs that a state chooses
to -manage.
5. 1 F. GRAD,
supra note 1, 8 1.03, at 1-21.
6. Title I11 of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 08 11,001-11,050 (Supp. V 1987)).
7. Pub. L. No. 100-582,102 Stat. 2950 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. $8 6992-6992k (West
Supp. 1989)).
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2. EPA should ensure a state has developed and has authority to
implement a reasonable enforcement strategy before authorizing a
state to cany out the enforcement responsibility for a federal
program.

3. Once a state has been authorized to carry out a federal program,
most enforcement cases should be handled by the state without
EPA intervention.

4. EPA should retain authority to bring enforcement actions in
cases involving significant interstate pollution.
5. States should be able to refer certain enforcement cases to EPA.

6. Systems used to account for progress in enforcement should be
based on state enforcement strategies and should be' designed to
encourage innovation by states.

7. EPA should maintain a credible threat to withdraw authority
from states whose implementation of federal programs is consistently inadequate.
To provide the background necessary for understanding the
need for a set of principles upon which enforcement responsibilities are allocated, this Article will first examine the historical
allocation of environmental enforcement responsibilities between
the federal and state governments. It will then review the major
federal environmental legislation to identify how enforcement roles
are divided between the various governmental bodies and to examine how federal enforcement policies under those laws effect
state enforcement. Finally, a discussion of a series of new problems facing environmental enforcement officials will precede a
detailed review of the suggested principles for allocating enforcement responsibilities.
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"Environmental law" is not an innovation of the last two
decades, of course. As Professor Rodgers notes in his treatise on
environmental law, "[plrivate nuisance law long has forbidden
substantial and unreasonable intrusions upon the use and enjoyPrivate nuisance cases are reported
ment of another's pr~perty."~
as early as the sixteenth ~ e n t u r y . ~
Governmental involvement with environmental problems
traces its history to the associated principle of public nuisance. A
public nuisance is one that affects an interest common to the
general public, rather than an interest peculiar to one or several
individual^.^^ This public wrong is normally redressed by the government." Public nuisance actions have been brought by state and
local governments to deal with a wide variety of environmental
problems. Examples of problems addressed using nuisance law
include the escape of petroleum from a storage tank into the
groundwater,12 the discharge of chemicals into a watercourse,13
smoke and gas emissions from a charcoal kiln,14 the storage of
hazardous explosive material^,^^ odors from the operation of a
rendering plant,I6 the maintenance of an open irrigation ditch,"
the improper operation of a chemical waste disposal site,18and the
discharge of mercury-contaminated waste into a waterway.lg
States use other common law theories to address environmental problems, such as trespass, negligence, strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities, water law, and public trust doc8. W. RODGERS,HANDBOOK
ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW101 (1977).
9. Id. (citing Z. CHAFFEE& E. RE, CASES& MATERIALS
ON EQUITY
795-96 (4th
ed. 1958)).
LAWOF TORTS585 (1971).
10. W. PROSSER,
11. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF TORTS§ 821C (1969); 1 W. RODGERS,ENVIRONMENTAL LAW8 2.2, at 34 (1986).
12. Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 336 (1895).
13. West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21,72 N.E. 879 (1904).
14. Richards v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 684, 114 P. 896 (1911).
15. State v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254, 169 S.W. 267 (1914).
16. State ex rel. Harris v. Drayer, 218 Iowa 446, 255 N.W. 532 (1934).
17. City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 155 Neb. 723, 53 N.W.2d 543
(1952).
18. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d. 1,426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
19. State v. Ventron Corp., 182 N.J. Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 (App. Div. 1981),
aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part, 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
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trine.20 Environmental enforcement based on nuisance and other
common law theories was, and still is, primarily the domain of
.~~
beginning in the late 19407s,states
states and l ~ c a l i t i e s Finally,
adopted a variety of statutes to help address environmental
problems.22
Although federal and state governments took some steps to
deal with worsening environmental problems, by the late 1960's
the nation's environment was visibly hemorrhaging. Dirty air, polluted streams and lakes, and tainted drinking water supplies were
being identified in all parts of the country.23State and local common law regulation and enforcement, and the then limited statutory
law available to states was not adequate to resolve such severe
problems.24
Several factors. contributed to the inadequacy of state programs. The case-by-case approach, necessitated by nuisance and
other common law actions, was simply too slow, too cumbersome,
20. W. RODGERS,
supra note 8, at 100. See also ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWINSTITUTE,
STATEHAZARDOUS
WASTEENFORCEMENT
STUDY97 (1987) [hereinafter STATEHAZARDOUS WASTESTUDY].
21. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Supreme Court held that
"[wlhen we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal
common law . ."Id. at 103. Only nine years later, the Supreme Court all but closed the
door on the federal environmental common law. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981), the Supreme Court concluded that:

..

Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal [water pollution]
standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate
nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied
the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program
supervised by an expert administrative agency. The 1972 Amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act were not merely another law "touching
interstate waters" of the sort surveyed in Illinois v. Milwaukee, and found
inadequate to supplant federal common law. Rather, the Amendments were
viewed by Congress as a "total restructuring" and "complete rewriting" of the
.The establishexisting water pollution legislation considered in that case
ment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which
certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program
with federal common law.

...

Id. at 317-19. Most of the federal laws enacted after 1970 have been similarly comprehensive
in nature and thus are likely to have displaced federal common law. See 1 W. RODGERS,
supra note 11, § 2.14, at 122.
22. See, e.g., 1945 Minn. Laws 395, 8 11 (relating to water pollution); 1947 Cal. Stat.
632, § 1 (establishing air pollution control districts); 1954 N.J. Laws 212, 5 1 (Air Pollution
Control Act).
23. See S. REP. NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969).
24. See 1 F. GRAD,supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-20.
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and too unpredictable to handle the rapidly expanding number of
environmental problems.25State statutory law controlling environmental pollution had not adequately developed in most states.26
Further, state laws could not adequately handle interstate air or
water pollution problems.27 Economic competition among the
states also put pressure on states not to make their environmental
laws significantly more stringent than those of other states.28 Finally, while public interest in environmental protection was growing, the public consensus needed to expand state enforcement
resources had not yet emerged.29
It was apparent by 1970 that the emergency measures necessary to control environmental pollution had to come from the
federal government. The resulting flurry of environmental
legislation30 greatly increased the federal regulatory role. Along
with this expanded regulatory role came a growing federal role in
environmental enforcement and enforcement policy.
To understand the federal and state enforcement roles, it is
helpful to review the genera1 structure of the state and federal
roles,in federal environmental programs and to examine the allocation of enforcement responsibilities in each of the major federal
environmental laws.
25. See F. SKILLERN,ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION:
THE LEGALFRAMEWORK

11.25, at 18-19 (1981); see also F. ANDERSON,
D. MANDELKER
& A. TARLOCK,
ENVIRONPROTECTION:
LAWAND POLICY56-58 (1984).
26. See 1 F. GRAD,supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-20.
27. See id. 8 1.03, at 1-20 to -21.
LAW INSTITUTE,FEDERALENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 3
28. See ENVIRONMENTAL
(1974).
29. See, e.g., AMERICANS
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
THERISINGTIDE:PUBLICOPINION, POLICY& POLITICS
5-4 to -5 (1989).
30. Among the major federal environmental laws enacted beginning in 1970 were the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 UkS.C. $5 1251-1376
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. V 1987));
the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523,88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. $5 300f-300j (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $8 69016991i (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. $8 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-69913
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title 111, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,00111,050 (Supp. V 1987)); and the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100582, 102 Stat. 2950 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.,§§ 6992-6992k (West Supp. 1989)).
MENTAL
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Most of the major federal environmental laws divide responsibilities for environmental programs between the states and the
federal government. Typically, a federal law will allow states to
assume responsibility for carrying out a regulatory program if a
state demonstrates that it has adequate authority and resources to
implement and enforce the law. Federal laws refer to approved
state proflams in several ways, ranging from states with programs
having "primary enforcement responsibility," or "primacy," to
states with programs having "approval," or "authorization," of
state plans by EPA with joint federal-state enforcement. Federal
authorization of a state program is usually a prerequisite for receiving federal funding to help support the program.
EPA typically retains some enforcement authority, although
limitations may be placed on this authority. EPA's retained enforcement authority will be reviewed in detail in this Article. EPA
also retains the ability to withdraw any authority delegated to a
state if the state consistently fails to carry out its responsibilities.
The delegation of responsibility to the states combined with
some retained authority raises legal questions of when the state or
federal government will be precluded from pursuing an action that
has been resolved by the other governmental body.31The overlapping authority has an even more important practical effect. EPA's
independent authority to file enforcement actions has no doubt
resulted in stronger enforcement actions in some cases enforced
at the state level. It has also caused frequent conflicts with the
states, especially when it is used in a case where a state has already
initiated an enforcement action against a facility.
This practice, known as "overfiling," is designed to protect
against inadequate state enforcement actions.32 Overfiling, how31. See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
32. See UNITEDSTATESENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,OFFICEOF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
MONITORING,
POLICYFRAMEWORK
FOR STAT-PA
ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS
22-23 (1986). The overfiling policy states that EPA may take
enforcement action if the content of a state enforcement action is "inappropriate." Id. at
22. An inappropriate action is described as one where the "remedies are clearly inappropriate to correct the violation, if compliance schedules are unacceptably extended, or if
there is no appropriate penalty or sanction." Id. at 22-23. Finally, the policy provides that
EPA generally will not consider taking direct enforcement action solely for the recovery
of additional penalties unless a state penalty is determined to be "grossly deficient." Id. at
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ever, can disrupt state enforcement programs in several ways. The
most important consequence of overfiling is an increased reluctance of regulated entities to deal solely with state enforcement
officials. After an overfiling, the regulated entities quite understandably become concerned that, without involving EPA, they
cannot be sure a compliance schedule or a penalty amount agreed
to by a state is final. As a result, states may find it more difficult
to reach-settlements in cases initiated subsequent to an overfiling,
Overfiling cases also use a great deal of the limited governmental enforcement resources simply dealing with other government regulators. Finally, overfiling cases frequently cause significant problems in the working relationship between state and
federal regulat,ors.
IV. THEEXPANSION
O F T H E FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT
ROLE
A. Clean Air Act

I

The passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197033
initiated the rapid expansion of the federal enforcement role. The
expanded federal role under the Clean Air Act was, however,
relatively modest. Federal enforcement authority was limited to
taking enforcement action in a state with an approved state implementation plan ("SIP") if the state failed to initiate an action within
thirty days after being notified of a violation.34
Under the Clean Air Act, the central regulatory mechanism
is the SIP.35The SIP must provide for the "implementation, maintenance and enforcement" of air quality standards in the state.36
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

23. While this policy appears on its face to circumscribe EPA's ability to second guess
state enforcement actions, its effect is limited for at least three reasons. First, the policy
still leaves EPA with substantial discretion to determine whether a state enforcement action
is "inappropriate." Second, EPA has final authority to make the decision on inappropriateness. Third, the policy is only guidance to EPA regions and to states.
33. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 55 74017642 (1982)).
34. See id. 5 7413(a)(l). For mobile sources of air pollutants (e.g., automobiles) the
federal role is more expansive than for stationary sources. Violations of mobile source
requirements are enforceable only by the federal government. See id. $5 7523, 7524.
supra note 8, at 230-38.
35. See id. 5 7410(a)(l). See also W. RODGERS,
36. 42 U.S.C. 5 7410(a)(l) (1982).
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EPA must approve any SIP or revision to a SIP if it is adequate
to meet federal standard^.^' The SIP is specifically required to
provide for enforcement of emission limits and other regulations
relating to stationary sources of air pollution.38
Direct federal enforcement of an approved SIP requirement
is authorized only if a violation of the SIP continues more than
thirty days after EPA has notified the violator and the state of the
violation.39This notice period allows a state to initiate an enforcement action against the violator before EPA becomes involved.
While EPA must review any resulting compliance plan,4O raising
the possibility of overfiling, the practical effect of the notice period
is to provide more state control over enforcement actions.
EPA can also take over all SIP enforcement in a state. Federal
assumption of SIP enforcement is authorized only if EPA,finds
that violations of the SIP are "so widespread that such violations
appear to result from a failure of the State . . . to enforce the plan
effe~tively."~~
Even though the new federal enforcement authority provided
in the Clean Air Act was relatively narrow in comparison to later
federal laws, it was a substantial expansion of previous federal
a ~ t h o r i t y .The
~ ~ 1967 Air Quality Act43 had authorized federal
enforcement only to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and only when state or local authorities had
failed to act.44 The 1970 amendments shifted the focus of federal
involvement from extraordinary circumstances to a more general
role in regulatory enforcement.
37. Id. S 7410(a)(2).
38. Id. S 7410(a)(2)@). If a state fails to submit an implementation plan that meets
the requirements of the Clean Air Act, if a state implementation plan or a portion of a plan
is determined by EPA not to accord with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, or if a
state fails to revise an implementation plan after being notified by EPA, EPA may propose
an implementation plan or a portion of one for the state. Id. S 7410(c)(l). The federal
implementation plan must be promulgated by the Administrator within six months after the
date the state ~ l a nor revision was to have been submitted unless the state has a d o ~ t e d
and submitted plan or revision prior to the promulgation of the federal implementation
plan. Id.
39. Id. S 7413(a)(l).
40. Id. S 7410(a)(3).
41. Id. S 7413(a)(2). Thirty days advance notice of the proposed assumption of
enforcement responsibility is required. Id.
42. See Environmental Law Institute, Federal-State Partnerships Under Three EPA
Programs: A Legislative History 11-14 (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter Federal-State Partnerships].
43. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat, 485 (1967).
44. Id. S 108(K).
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B. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The federal law regulating pesticides follows the advance notice -pattern used in the Clean Air Act to allocate enforcement
authority. The - Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
("FIFRA") regulates the manufacture, distribution, sale, and
use of pesticides. The law requires pesticides to be registered with
EPA.46 Data on the safety of a pesticide must be submitted to
EPA, if requested by the Adminstrator, to support the registrat i ~ n EPA
. ~ ~may decide not to register a pesticide, register it for
general use, or register the pesticide only for restricted uses.48The
use of registered pesticides is controlled by requiring the certification of most applicators49 and the submission and review of
pesticide labels.50
State authority to regulate pesticides is limited under FIFRA.51 However, FIFRA allows a state to assume "primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use violations" once EPA
has determined that a state has adopted adequate pesticide use
laws, has adopted and is implementing adequate procedures for
enforcing the laws, and will keep adequate compliance records.52
States may also enter into cooperative agreements with EPA to
enforce pesticide use restriction^.^^ In this case, the state essentially is acting as an agent for EPA in enforcing federal law.
EPA may initiate an enforcement action in a state with primary enforcement responsibility only after providing the state with
thirty days advance notice and after determining that the state has
not commenced an appropriate enforcement action.54The FIFRA
standard appears to allow a somewhat greater federal role than
the Clean Air Act since EPA is authorized to bring an enforcement
action, after providing thirty days notice, if it determines that a
45. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
46. Id. § 136a(a).
47. Id. 8 136a(c).
48. Id. § 136a(d).
49. Id. 8 136i.
50. Id. § 163a(c)(l)(C).
51. For example, states may not impose labeling or packaging requirements in addition to or different from those required by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. See id. 8 136v(b).
52. Id. § 136w-l(a).
53. Id. 8 136~-l(b).
54. Id. § 136w-2(a).
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state enforcement action was not "appropriate." Under the Clean
Air Act, EPA is only authorized to commence an enforcement
action if the violation in question continues after the thirty-day
notice period has expired.
Under FIFRA, state primacy can be rescinded if EPA determines that the state is not carrying out its responsibilities, provides
the state ninety days to correct the deficiencies, and determines
. ~ ~ FIFRA enforcethat the state program remains i n a d e q ~ a t eThe
ment scheme, like the scheme under the Clean Air-Act, evidences
a strong preference for state enforcement even though the federal
government may take an enforcement action under limited
circumstances.

C. Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act
Although the Clean Air Act and FIFRA expanded the federal
enforcement role, states still controlled most enforcement cases
because of the mandatory advance notice requirements. The mandatory advance notice requirement was not included in the Federal
Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1972 ("Clean Water
The result was a significant expansion of the federal enforcement role.
The principal regulatory mechanism in the Clean Water Act
is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit.57Almost all facilities that discharge pollutants
into a watercourse must hold an NPDES permit.58Each NPDES
permit contains a series of discharge limits designed to reflect the
, ~protect
~
the quality
best currently available control t e ~ h n o l o g yto
of receiving waters,60and to limit the release of toxic p o l l ~ t a n t s . ~ ~
The authority to issue NPDES permits may be delegated to a
state62if the state demonstrates, among other things, that it has
adequate authority "[tlo abate violations of the permit or the permit
55. Id. § 136~-2(b).
56. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
57. Id. § 1342.
58. Exceptions to the requirements of holding
- an NPDES permit are set out in 40
C.F.R. 5 122.3 (1988).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
60. Id. § 1313(a)(l).
61. zd. 8 1317(aj(2).
62. Id. § 1342(b).
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program, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and
means of e n f ~ r c e m e n t . " ~ ~
EPA retains enforcement authority under the Clean Water Act
even if the NPDES permitting process has been delegated to a
state.64 Unlike the Clean Air Act and FIFRA, the Clean Water
Act allows EPA to initiate an enforcement action against a facility
EPA may proin a delegated state without advance notificati~n.~~
vide thirty-day advance notice of an enforcement action to the
state, but it is not required to do so.66
While the Clean Water Act made only a simple change in the
federal-state enforcement relationship in not including the advance
notice requirement, the result was a substantially heightened federal impact on state enforcement. Instead of being required to give
states an opportunity to take action to ensure that a violation is
corrected, EPA can initiate its own enforcement case immediately.
D. Safe Drinking Water Act

The federal law regulating public drinking water supplies further expanded federal enforcement authority by authorizing direct
federal involvement in enforcement actions where an imminent
hazard has been identified. The Safe Drinking Water Act6' regulates the quality of public drinking water systems and the underground injection of contaminants. The drinking water system portion of the law requires the establishment of drinking water
regulations identifying the maximum acceptable contaminant level
63. Id. 1 1342(b)(7).
64. Id. 8 1319(a).
65. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorizes federal reassumption of all
enforcement responsibilities where the Administrator finds widespread violations of permit
conditions or limitations. Id. 8 1319(a)(2). At least 30 days advance notice to the state is
required in this case. Id.
66. The statute provides:
Whenever . . . the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any
condition or limitation which implements section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1328, or 1345 of this title in a permit issued by a state under an approved
permit program . . .he shall proceed under his [order or civil penalty] authority
. . . or he shall notify the person in alleged violation and such state of such
finding.
33 U.S.C. 8 1319(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
67. 42 U.S.C. $0 300f-300j (1982 and Supp. V 1987).
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of various chemicals for a public drinking water supply.68 The
underground injection provisions of the law only permit authorization, by permit or rule, of injections which will not endanger
drinking water sources.69
States are authorized to assume primary enforcement responsibility for the drinking water supply program if the state has,
among other things, adopted drinking water regulations which are
no less stringent than the federal regulations, and has adopted and
is implementing adequate procedures for the enforcement of the
~ ~ the underground injection program, EPA
state r e g ~ l a t i o n s .For
is required to publish a list of states in which EPA believes an
~ ~obtain primary
underground injection program is n e ~ e s s a r y .To
enforcement authority a listed state must demonstrate that it has
adopted an underground injection control program that meets the
requirements of regulations issued by EPA.72
Unlike the Clean Water Act, federal enforcement in a state
with primacy for the drinking water system program ordinarily is
authorized only if EPA has notified the state and the public water
system, and provided "such advice and technical assistance to
such State and public water system as may be appropriate to bring
the system into compliance with such regulation or requirement
by the earliest feasible time."73 If the violation continues beyond
sixty days, EPA may initiate an enforcement action.74 Similarly,
the underground injection portion of the law ordinarily requires
EPA to provide thirty days notice to the state and an opportunity
for the state to take appropriate enforcement action before EPA
may commence an action.75
However, in contrast to earlier statutes, the EPA Administrator is authorized to initiate an enforcement action under both the
drinking water and underground injection programs in a state with
primacy whenever EPA determines that the presence of a contaminant presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to the
public health, and that state and local authorities have not acted
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

8 300g-l(B).
8 300h(b)(l).
0 3OOg-2(a).
§ 300h-l(a).
8 3OOh-l(b)(l)(A).
13OOg-3(a)(l)(A).
§ 3OOg-3(a)(l)(B).
8 300h-2(a)(l).
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to protect the public health.76 The Administrator is required to
consult with the state and local authorities only "[tlo the extent
he determines it to be practicable in light of such imminent
endangerment. "77
The Safe Drinking Water Act endangerment enforcement authority, more so than federal enforcement authority in early statutes, permits a quite independent federal enforcement role. Even
though the Clean Water Act permits the federal government to
proceed without notifying the state, the statutory language at least
provides an optional procedure for allowing the state to act before
EPA proceeds with an enforcement case.78The endangerment provision of the Safe Drinking Water Act conceivably permits a federal enforcement action to be initiated in a state without prior
notice to the state.
E. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

The degree of federal involvement in environmental enforcement increased significantly with the development of the hazardous
waste regulatory program under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA").79 Under the RCRA program, the
federal government has the authority not only to bring a direct
federal enforcement action in a state, but also to control, through
federal enforcement policy, the design of state enforcement
programs.
The RCRA hazardous waste program is based on an extremely
detailed set of federal rules that regulate the generation, storage,
transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste.80
These "cradle to grave" regulations require that all "suspect"
~~
wastes be tested to determine if they are h a z a r d o u ~ ,mandate
hazardous waste be transported in appropriate containers that are
clearly labeled as containing hazardous waste,s2provide for proper
storage condition^,^^ require that a manifest accompany each ship76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. § 300i.
Id.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
42 U.S.C. $8 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
See 40 C.F.R. $0 260-265 (1988).
Id. § 261.10.
Id. §§ 262.3C.31.
Id. § 262.34.
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ment of hazardous waste by a generator,84 and establish design
and operating standards for treatment, storage, and disposal
facilitie~.~~
In order to assume responsibility for the RCRA program,
states are required to adopt rules that are "equivalent" to the
federal regulation^.^^ However, even in authorized states, EPA
retains extensive enforcement authority under RCRA.87EPA may
(1) assess civil penalties through an administrative order, (2) issue
compliance orders, (3) revoke or suspend permits, (4) commence
civil judicial enforcement actions, or (5) initiate criminal investig a t i o n ~RCRA
. ~ ~ also allows EPA to exercise authority similar to
its authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act when the Administrator determines that an imminent hazard exists.89
Except in the case of an imminent hazard, notice must be
provided to a state with an authorized program at the time EPA
initiates an enforcement action.g0 However, the advance notice
provisions in prior federal laws that allow a state time to resolve
the matter are not required under RCRA.91This structure raises
the same types of overfiling concerns present under the Safe Drinking Water Act. However, the more important issue under RCRA
is the effect that EPA's RCRA "Enforcement Response Policy"g2
has had on the structure of state enforcement programs.
The Enforcement Response Policy is guidance
by
EPA to its regional offices and to states on what EPA considers
to be "timely and appropriate" enforcement responses to violations
of the RCRA regulation^.^^ As guidance, the Enforcement Response Policy is not binding on states. However, the policy is
important because compliance with it is one of the most significant
criteria for evaluating the performance of state programs. Federal
funding for state programs is, in turn, dependent upon the performance evaluation.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. § 262.20.
Id. S 264.
42 U.S.C. § 6926f.b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
See id. § 6928. See also Federal-State Partnershim,
- . suDra note 42, at 32.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Id. § 6973(a).
Id. 88 6928(a)(2), 6973(a).
Id. § 6973(c).

UNITEDSTATESENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,OFFICEOF SOLID
RESPONSE,
ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE
POLICY
(1987) [hereinafter
WASTEAND EMERGENCY
ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE
POLICY].
93. Id. at 3, 4, 12-15.
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Target numbers of inspections and estimates of the number
of enforcement actions that a state is expected to meet during a
fiscal year are based on an assumption that compliance will be
achieved by the initiation of numerous administrative and judicial
enforcement actions.94By focussing on a limited range of enforcement alternatives and by mandating rapid response to violations,
the policy inhibits states from using enforcement techniques that
may,be more effective than those that EPA would utilize.9s
In addition, EPA's enforcement policies focus on investigations of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities and large generators ;rather than on small-quantity hazardous waste generat o r ~ In
. ~ states
~
such as Minnesota, there are few treatment,
storage, or disposal facilities and relatively few large generators.
There. are, however, a very large number of small-quantity generators. Thus, one of the most significant enforcement concerns is
~ ~ Enforcement Resmall-quantity generator ~ o m p l i a n c e .The
sponse Policy, however, constrains states from directing their limited enforcement resources to these generators.
94. STATEHAZARDOUS
WASTESTUDY,supra note 20, at 88.
95. According to one study:
By encouraging compliance orders and civil penalty actions rather than shutdown orders, permit "bars," suspensions or revocations, bond forfeitures, and
personal civil and criminal liability, EPA actually encourages affirmative actions in which the agency canies the burden of proof and the burden of going
forward and tolerates delay and litigation on the public's time, with the consequent devotion of limited technical and legal resources to virtually all cases
rather than a concentration of resources on a few, targeted individuals or
entities. By limiting the time for initiating action on a "RCRA violation," the
state may be precluded (or at least discouraged) from addressing the major
problem at a site with the most powerful and relevant legal tools, strategies
and resources, and is encouraged to initiate a minor, relatively ineffective and
limited, enforcement action for no reason other than to satisfy EPA timeframes
and policies.
~.

Id. at 99-100.
96. A person who generates between 100 and 1000 kilograms of hazardous waste in
any month. Interview with Gordon Wegwart, assistant director, Hazardous Waste Division,
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Sept. 11, 1989). See also 40 C.F.R. 1 262.44 (1988).
97. -Improper disposal of hazardous waste by small-quantity generators can produce
serious environmental problems. For example, disposal of under 100 gallons of the drycleaning solvent perchloroethylene by a small-town dry-cleaning operation in Minnesota
resulted in groundwater contamination that required the closing of a city well and dozens
of private wells. The remedial costs have exceeded $1 million. Interview with Gary Pulford,
chief, Site Response Section, Ground Water and Solid Waste Division, Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (Sept. 5, 1989).
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F. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
With the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund"),gsthe federal role in enforcement reached its zenith. CERCLA, in contrast to the other laws discussed in this Article, is not
a regulatory program. Instead, it is desigried to accomplish the
cleanup of hazardous waste disposal sites by establishing liability
standards for persons responsible for disposal activitiesg9and creating a federal fund to be used when responsible parties do not
conduct the cleanups.loOThe principal regulation under CERCLA,
the National Contingency Pl?n,lo1 simply provides directions on
carrying out cleanup actions.lo2
There are thousands of old hazardous waste disposal facilities
in the country, representing varying degrees of risk to public health
and the environment.103Congress directed EPA to prioritize sites
in accordance with their risk. As a result, the Superfund program
established by CERCLA focusses on sites listed on the National
Priorities List.lo4The National Priorities List consists of those sites
scoring above a threshold value on EPAYshazard ranking system.los Over 1100 sites, assumed to be the worst in the country,
are currently listed on the National Priorities List.Io6
A major goal of CERCLA is to encourage persons responsible
for the release of a hazardous substance to undertake the necessary
cleanup activities.Io7Therefore, the Superfund program essentially
98. 42 U.S.C. 58 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
99. Id. § 9607.
100. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. V 1987) (originally enacted as CERCLA, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 8 221, 94 Stat. 2767, 2801 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982)));
CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 3 232, 94 Stat. 2767, 2804 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C.
5 9641 (1982)) repealed by Superfund Amemndments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.
L.N0.99-499, § 514, 100 Stat. 1613, 1767.
101. 42 U.S.C. 8 9605 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
102. See 40 C.F.R. 8 300 (1988).
LAWINSTITUTE,AN ANALYSIS
OF STATESUPERFUND
103. See ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS:
50-STATESTUDYat 111-3 to -5 (Aug. 18, 1989).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
105. See 40 C.F.R. § 300, apps. A, B (1988).
WORK:RECOMMENDATIONS
TO IM106. CLEANSITES, MAKINGTHE SUPERFUND
PROVE PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION
1 (Jan. 1989).
107. See 42 U.S.C. $8 9606(b)(1), 9622 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., United States House of Representatives, Status of
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was designed to be an enforcement program,Io8but little of this
enforcement responsibility was provided to the states. CERCLA
did not authorize any form of delegation to the states. The ability
to issue cleanup orders was lodged solely with EPA.lo9The only
"enforcement" authority given a state was an ability to recover in
federal court the costs a state had incurred in connection with a
cleanup."O States only gradually assumed any role in the Superfund process, primarily acting as agents of EPA in overseeing
projects paid for with federal funds."' While a few states have
initiated enforcement actions against responsible parties at National Priorities List sites, EPA has maintained its prerogative to
seek additional relief against the responsible parties.
EPA practice under the Superfund program has emphasized
the use of Superfund dollars to clean up hazardous waste sites,
rather than an aggressive effort to seek cleanup commitments from
responsible parties.H2The result has been that EPA's Superfund
Not surprisingly,
enforcement program has been underf~nded."~
the Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Program 2 (Mar. 1988) (unreleased)
[hereinafter Superfund Program Status] (on file with HARV.ENVTL.L. REV.).
108. A 1985 report issued by the United States House of Representatives noted that:
The current reauthorization, coming when it does, forces Congress to
face a very fundamental policy question: how to ensure in the future that there
are adequate resources, and to see that past, thoroughly repudiated, mismanagement problems are behind us.
H.R. 2817 has been written with the underlying belief that Congress
should focus on ways to ensure rapid and thorough cleanup of abandoned
hazardous wastes rather than on past mistakes. It is clear from the accumulating
data on waste sites that EPA will never have adequate monies or manpower
to address the problem itself. As a result, an underlying principle of H.R. 2817
is that Congress must facilitate cleanups of hazardous substances by the responsible parties while assuring a strong EPA oversight role with a set of tough
legal enforcement standards.
H.R. REP. NO. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1985).
109. See 42 U.S.C. 8 9606 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
110. See id. 8 9607(a)(4)(A).
111. The 1986 amendments to CERCLA require that states be provided with a
"substantial and meaningful" role in designating National Priority List sites, developing
cleanup plans, and settling with responsible parties. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 8 121(f), 100 Stat. 1613, 1676 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 8 9621(f) (Supp. V 1987)). The draft revisions of the
National Contingency Plan required by SARA permit states to assume the lead role in
overseeing work at National Priority List sites. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,393,51,454-56 (1988). Still,
states are not delegated the authority to run the CERCLAISARA enforcement program in
the manner states are authorized to mangge other federal environmental programs.
112. See CLEANSITES, supra note 106, at 7-8.
113. Id. at 7.
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financial and other resources available from EPA to the states to
pursue enforcement actions have been correspondingly limited.n4
The combined effect of the failure of CERCLA to delegate
enforcement responsibilities to the states, the inability of states to
settle conclusively National Priorities List cases with responsible
parties, EPA's emphasis on cleanups financed with dollars from
the Superfund, and the limited enforcement resources available to
EPA and the states has resulted in a low level of enforcement
activity under CERCLA.H5In addition, because of EPA's lack of
emphasis on enforcement, states that have had successful hazardous waste cleanup enforcement programs have administered the
programs essentially independent of the federal program.l16

V. REVERSING
THE TREND
Beginning in the mid-1980's, the trend toward federalizing
environmental enforcement and enforcement policymaking began
to change. The three newest federal environmental programs all
provide for a much stronger state enforcement role. Unfortunately,
no clear pattern for allocating enforcement responsibilities can be
gleaned from these new statutes. Rather, this change appears to
have been produced by federal budgetary limitations and by the
administrative difficulty created by the large number of facilities
regulated by these laws.
114. Only $5 million was available to support state enforcement actions nationwide
in each of federal fiscal years 1988 and 1989. Interview with Gary Pulford, chief, Site
Response Section, Ground Water and Solid Waste Division, Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (Oct. 30, 1989).
115. See SENATESUBCOMM.
ON SUPERFUND,
OCEANAND WATERPROTECTION,
101s~
CONG.,IST SESS.,LAUTENBERG-DURENBERGER
REPORTON SUPERFUND:
CLEANING
UP THE NATION'SCLEANUP
PROGRAM
118-27 (1989).
116. In Minnesota, for example, the state adopted its own superfund legislation in
1983. Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, MINN.STAT. $ 115B (1988).
In November of 1988, 139 sites were listed on the state's "Permanent List of Priorities,"
40 of which were on the National Priority List. MINNESOTA
POLLUTION
CONTROL
AGENCY,
RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION
AND COMPLIREPORTON THE USE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
ANCE FUND
DURINGFISCAL
YEAR1988 4-5 (1988) (report on use of the state fund) (on file
with HARV.ENVTL.L. REV.). Response actions had been taken at 104 of the sites with 73
of the response actions conducted by responsible parties. Id. at 5. Response actions had
been completed at 38 sites by November of 1988. Id. at 6. Both the percentage of responsible
party funded response actions and the percentage of completed actions substantially exceeded the record of the federal Superfund program. See Superfund Program Status, supra
note 107, at ii; CLEANSITES,supra note 106, a t 1-2..
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A. Underground Storage Tanks

The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 to the
Solid Waste Disposal Act established a new program to regulate
underground storage tanks ("UST").H7 EPA's enforcement strategy for the program strongly supports the need for innovative state
enforcement, beginning the reversal of the trend toward increased
federalization of environmental enforcement."*
The UST program is designed to address two problems. First,
similar to the Superfund law, the UST program requires owners
of underground tanks to take corrective action with respect to the
release of petroleum from storage tanks.lIg Second, the Act mandates the development of regulations establishing new tank performance standards120and requirements for leak detection, record
keeping, and closure of tanks.I2l The responsibility for managing
the federal UST program may be delegated to a state if the state
standards are at least as stringent as the federal standards and the
state has adequate enforcement a ~ t h 0 r i t y . I ~ ~
The UST program combines some of the regulatory aspects
of RCRA with cleanup requirements similar to CERCLA. However, in marked contrast to CERCLA, the UST program relies
heavily on state enforcement. The enforcement strategy for the
program notes that "[sltates will be expected to conduct the ma~~
unlike
jority of enforcement actions" for the ~ r 0 g r a m . IFurther,
the RCRA enforcement strategy, the UST strategy provides that
EPA will approve a variety of state programs and will "encourage
States to use innovative approaches in all program areas."124
States may also administer the UST program without adopting
state rules. In an expansion of the cooperative agreement enforcement approach originated under FIFRA,125the UST law permits a
117. Pub. L. No. 98-616, Title VI, 98 Stat. 3221,3277-88 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 9 6991-69913 ( S ~ p p V
. 1987)).
118. UNITEDSTATESENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,OFFICEOF SOLID
RESPONSE,
FY 1989-FY 1990 COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT
WASTEAND EMERGENCY
FOR THE UNDERGROUND
STORAGE
TANKPROGRAM
3-5 (Jan. 5, 1989) [hereinSTRATEGY
after UST COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY].
119. 42 U.S.C. 9 6991b(h) (Supp. V 1987).
120. Id. 8 6991b(e).
121. Id. 9 6991b(c).
122. Id. 9 6991c(a).
123. UST COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY,
supra note 118, at 3.
124. Id. at 5.
125. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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state to exercise most of the enforcement authorities provided to
the EPA Administrator where (1) the Administrator determines a
state has the capabilities to carry out effective corrective actions
and enforcement activities, and (2) the Administrator has entered
into a cooperative agreement with the state.I26
EPA does retain the authority to issue compliance orders for
violations that occur in a state with a delegated UST progiam.12'
Notice to the states is required.128This provision does not cover
violations in a state where the state is exercising enforcement
authority pursuant to a cooperative agreement. Since the .state
essentially is acting as an agent of the federal government in this
case, EPA is probably precluded from taking enforcement action
where the state has already acted.129

B. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
The state role in enforcement of a federal program was significantly expanded by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA").130 Title III of SARA, the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("Emergency Planning Act"),I3l for the first time gave states extensive direct authority to enforce a federal environmental law in federal
Title I11 was introduced in response to the disaster in Bhopal,
India.133The Act was designed to upgrade planning for chemical
emergencies,134as well as to provide persons in communities where
hazardous substances are stored with information about which
126. 42 U.S.C. 3 6991b(h)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
127. Id. S 6991e(a)(2).
128. Id.
129. See STATEHAZARDOUS
WASTESTUDY,supra note 20, at 5.
130. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
38 9601-9675, 11,001-11,050 (SUPP.V 1987)).
131. 42 U.S.C. 33 11,001-11,050 (Supp. V 1987).
132. States have been authorized to initiate citizen suits under several of the principal
environmental statutes. Citizen suit provisions, however, frequently contain restrictions on
their use, such as advance notice requirements. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(b)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 3 300j-8(b) (1982 & Supp. V
1987); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 3 6972(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); and Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
3 7604@) (1982). Direct access to federal court is provided to states under section 107 of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 3 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). However, this section only enables
states to recover costs they have incurred in cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
133. See H.R. REP.NO. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 258 (1985).
134. See 42 U.S.C. 3 11,003 (Supp. V 1987).
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facilities utilize the hazardous materials.135The vehicle for accomplishing these purposes is a series of reporting requirements. The
Emergency Planning Act mandates submission of a variety of
reports and documents concerning the presence, release, and inventory of hazardous materials136to State Emergency Response
commission^,'^^ Local Emergency Planning C o m ~ n i t t e e s ,and
~~~
local fire departments. The Act also requires manufacturing facilities to quantify routine releases of toxic chemicals and to report
the releases to the state and to EPA.139
Unlike early environmental programs, the Emergency Planning Act extends direct federal enforcement authority to state and
local governments.140Since the Act mandates reporting requirements to state and local entities created by federal law and provides for direct enforcement by state and local governments, delegation authority was not included in the law. While the EPA and
state enforcement jurisdiction are not coextensive, the state authority extends to most of the key reporting requirements of the
Act.141 From the perspective of practical enforcement, it is significant that Congress has provided little funding to EPA to enforce
the Emergency Planning Act. As a result, EPA's enforcement
strategy for the Act relies heavily on state enf0r~ement.l~~
135. See id. § 11,022(e).
136. See id. $0 11,002, 11,004, 11021, 11022.
137. See id. § 11,00I(a).
138. See id. 5 11,00l(c).
139. Id. § 11,023.
140. Id. 8 11,046(a)(2).
141. States are not granted enforcement authority for violations related to reporting
releases of extremely hazardous substances under section 11,004 of the Emergency Planning
Act and related to reporting the routine release of toxic chemicals under section 11,023 of
the Act. Compare 42 U.S.C. 1 11,045 (Supp. V 1987) with 42 U.S.C. § 11,046 (Supp. V
1987).
142. EPA's Title I11 enforcement strategy provides that:
With the notable exception of section 313 Toxic Release Inventory requirements and section 322 Trade Secret submissions, Title 111 [the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act] was intended to be implemented
mainly as a state and local program. Consistent with Congressional intent, EPA
plans a two tiered approach for enforcement. First, EPA will place major
emphasis on enforcing those sections of Title I11 where it has primary governmental enforcement authority, namely sections 304 [spill reporting], 313 [toxic
release inventory], and 322 [trade secrets] . . .

.

Second, EPA will take enforcement action on a limited number of specific
cases referred by the State Emergency Response Commissions ("SERCs") for
violation of sections 302, 303, 311 and 312 . . . . However, EPA believes that
states have the primary responsibility for enforcement of sections 302,303,311
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C . Medical Waste Tracking Act
The direct statutory authorization of state enforcement programs was further expanded by recent legislation dealing with
medical waste. The Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988143provides participating states with the same enforcement authority as
the federal government. The Act establishes a demonstration medical waste tracking program for the states of New York, New
In addition, all of the Great Lakes
Jersey, and C0nne~ticut.l~~
states are included in the demonstration program unless the gov~~
ernor of a state decides to withdraw from the ~ r 0 g r a m . lThe
demonstration program in participating states will require specific
types of medical waste146to be separated from other waste, to be
placed in specially labeled contajners, and to be accompanied by
a manifest147if the waste is shipped o f f - ~ i t e . ~ ~ ~
The Medical Waste Tracking Act moves a step beyond the
Emergency Planning Act by providing coextensive enforcement
authority to the states and the federal government. The Act provides that a state may conduct inspections and take enforcement
actions against any person to the same extent as the EPA Adminand 312. State and Iocal governments are the recipients of the data submissions
for most of the requirements and are in the best position to identify violators.
SERCs and Local Emergency Planning Committees ("LEPCs") have the statutory authority to enforce sections 302,303,311 and 312 through civil actions.
Regional enforcement personnel should contact SERCs.in their regions to set
up counterparts for enforcement referrals and information exchange. This approach acknowledges that successful implementation of Title I11 requires states
to have an active role in enforcement.
United States ~nvironmentalProtection Agency, Draft Enforcement Strategy for CERCLA
1 103 and Title I11 Provisions 1-2 (Apr. 8, 1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter CERCLA
Enforcement Strategy] (on file with HARV.ENVTL.L. REV.).
143. Pub. L. No. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2950 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
$3 6992-6992K (West Supp. 1989)).
144. Id. 5 6992(a).
145. Id. All the Great Lakes states decided to withdraw from the program, except
New York, which was required to participate. Louisiana, Rhode Island, and the District
of Columbia initially petitioned for acceptance into the demonstration program. However,
Louisiana and the District of Columbia ultimately decided not to participate. See 54 Fed.
Reg. 35,189 (1989).
146. Regulated medical wastes include cultures and stocks of infectious agents,
human pathological wastes, human blood and blood products, animal wastes, isolation
ward wastes, and sharps. 54 Fed. Reg. 12,373 (1989).
147. A manifest is a shipping document that contains information on the shipper of
the waste, the nature of the waste to be shipped, the transporter, and the facility to which
the waste is to be shipped.
148. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6992b(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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i ~ t r a t 0 r . In
l ~ ~an interesting reversal of the practice under earlier
federal laws, the Act requires states to notify EPA when initiating
an enforcement action under the Act. lSO
Under the Medical Waste Tracking Act, just as under the
Emergency Planning Act, Congress provided very limited funding
to EPA for enforcement. As a result, EPA's enforcement strategy
again relies heavily on state enforcement.151
The structure of the Medical Waste Tracking Act has raised
a number of potential difficulties in the federal-state enforcement
relationship. The EPA enforcement strategy for the Act points out
that, in signing the law, then-President Reagan noted that
I have also been advised that Section 11007 of the bill, which
authorizes states "to take enforcement action against any person to the same extent as the Administrator" may raise serious
constitutional problems. To the extent that Congress provided
for States to prosecute crimes or exercise other executive
branch authority, it could be inconsistent with the Appointments Clause of the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~

Further, the EPA enforcement strategy asserts that a state enforcement action brought in federal court under the Medical Waste
Tracking Act is not binding on EPA.lS3This asserted non-binding
effect of state enforcement actions creates a significant problem
for state enforcement officials. Knowing the federal government
believes it could pursue an independent action even if the state
action is brought directly under federal law, the regulated party
may be reluctant to settle an enforcement action with a state.
Finally, the policy provides that all penalties collected by a state
in such an action must be paid to the Federal Treasury.lS4The fact
149. Id. § 6992f(a).
150. Id.
151. The enforcement strategy for the Medical Waste Tracking Act provides that
"[tlhe task of implementing the Medical Waste Tracking Program will lie primarily with the
States. States will have the lead for conducting inspections related to, and enforcement of,
the medical waste tracking program." United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Medical Waste Enforcement Strategy 8
(1989) (on file with HARV.ENVTL.L. REV.).
152. Id.
153. Id. Similar concerns about whether a state enforcement action will preclude a
subsequent federal enforcement action exist under most of the major environmental laws.
However, no other federal law has provided as much direct enforcement authority to the
states as the Medical Waste Tracking Act. Thus, the preclusion issue is heightened in cases
brought under the Act.
154. Id.
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that any fines collected as a result of a state enforcement-action
are to be paid to the Federal Treasury may be a substantial disincentive for a state to pursue an enforcement action directly under
the authority of the Medical Waste Tracking Act.
Given these limitations, the enforcement program for the Medical Waste Tracking Act as implemented through EPA's enforcement strategy will likely be very difficult to carry out in the absence
of parallel state enforcement legislation.

VI. THE NEEDFOR A REASSESSMENT
OF THE STATEAND
FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT
ROLES
The preceding discussion depicts the varying approaches to
the state and federal roles in environmental enforcement taken by
Congress and EPA over the past two decades under the major
federal environmental programs. In particular, it demonstrates a
dramatic federalization of enforcement in the 1970's and early
1980's and an apparent reversal of this trend in the last half of the
1980's.
No set of principles readily emerges from the analysis of these
laws and the underlying federal enforcement policy to explain why
enforcement responsibilities were allocated to the federal or state
governments under each of the federal laws. Instead, the allocation
of responsibility appears to be haphazard, responding to shortterm problems rather than to any consistent theory ofdhe appropriate long-term roles of various levels of government.
This erratic pattern is perhaps the inevitable result of the
massive new environmental programs constructed during the
period. However, it is now clear that environmental enforcement
will be a bilateral responsibility of the federal and state governments over the long-term. Given this long-term enforcement relationship, it is important that a carefully considered set of principles
be utilized to allocate responsibilities between the federal and state
governments. Only by clearly understanding their respective roles
in enforcement can the states and the federal government establish
the effective enforcement programs necessary to respond to the
increased workload that has come with the expansion of environmental programs, given the limited resources available.
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Several factors make this a particularly important time to
develop a set of principles upon which enforcement responsibilities
can be consistently allocated. The first factor is the profound
change in environmental enforcement in the past five years resulting fiom the geometric expansion in the number of regulated
entities. From 1970 to the early 1980's the principal focus of environmental enforcement was on relatively few larger facilities,
perhaps numbering in the tens of thousands nationally. Beginning
with the expansion of the application of the RCRA regulations to
small-quantity hazardous waste generators,lSs the number of regulated entities grew rapidly. The scale of the enforcement problem
is demonstrated by the number of regulated entities in Minnesota.Is6There are more than 15,000 small-quantity hazardous waste
generators in the state.lS7The underground storage tank program
added another large universe of facilities to the enforcement
agenda. In Minnesota, there,are more than 33,000 regulated underground storage tanks.Is8 Reporting requirements under the
Emergency Planning Act further ballooned enforcement responsibilities. In Minnesota, the reporting requirements cover more
than 10,000 facilities.Is9 The Medical Waste Tracking Act will introduce thousands of previously unregulated facilities into the environmental .enforcement system in participating states. In Minnesota, there are more than 6000 facilities that generate infectious
medical waste,l60 a subset of the medical wastes regulated under
155. Prior to September 22, 1986, most of the federal RCRA regulations only applied
to persons who generated more than 1000 kilograms of hazardous waste a month. See 51
Fed. Reg. 10,150-51 (1986). In the 1986 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Congress required EPA to promulgate standards
for persons who generate.between 100 and 1000 kilograms of hazardous waste in a month.
See Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 221, 98 Stat. 3221, 3248 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 6921(d) (Supp.
V 1987)). One hundred kilograms equals 220 pounds or the equivalent of about one-half of
a 55-gallon drum.
156. Minnesota is a medium-sized state with a population of slightly over 4,100,000.
See STATEINFORMATION
BOOK1987-1988 at 379 (G. Jones ed. 1987).
157. Interview with Gordon Wegwart, assistant director, Hazardous Waste Division,
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Sept. 11, 1989).
158. Interview with Michael Kanner, chief, Tanks and Spills Section, Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency (Sept. 17, 1989).
159. Interview with Lee Tischler, director, Minnesota State Emergency Response
Commission (Apr. 17, 1989).
160. Infectious waste typically includes certain wastes from medical laboratories,
blood and some othQ body fluids, hypodermic needles and syringes, and waste from
research animals intentionally exposed to agents that are infectious to humans. See OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL,STATE O F MINNESOTA,
REPORTAND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE REGULATION
OF INFECTIOUS
WASTE111-9 to -22 (Aug. 1988). Although Minnesota
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the federal law.l61 In the next few years it is likely that groundwater
protection programs will be adopted in many states.162When enacted, these groundwater programs will add thousands more regulated entities to the enforcement responsibilities of officials in the
states involved.
It will be difficult for government to respond effectively to
this vastly expanded workload. One consequence is that enforcement programs likely will be required to focus more on general
deterrence163of violations rather than on cases designed only to
resolve specific violations. Federal enforcement policies also will
have to provide states with incentives to utilize innovative approaches rather than constrain states by imposing federal enforcement preferences on them. lri4
withdrew from participation in the Medical Waste Tracking Act demonstration program,
the state legislature adopted legislation regulating the management of infectious waste. See
1989 Minn. Laws 337.
161. Interview with Pauline Bouchard, division director, Division of Environmental
Health; Minnesota Department of Health (Mar. 2, 1989).
162. Arizona, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, among others, have already adopted
comprehensive groundwater protection legislation. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S§ 45-401
to -636 (1987); IOWACODESS 455E.1--11 (1989); 1989 Minn. Laws 326; WIS. STAT. ANN.
09 160.001-.SO (West 1989).
163. In its analysis of hazardous waste enforcement under RCRA, the Environmental
Law-Institute noted that:
Because it is impossible ordinarily to achieve specific deterrence [in the RCRA
program] (site-by-site detection and citation of every violation ever committed),
credible enforcement programs must also rely on general deterrence (volutary
compliance induced by awareness of the risk of detection and the net effect of
the likely sanction as compared with the benefit of noncompliance). Credible
general deterrence efforts generally require (1) public awareness of active
enforcement personnel, (2) public awareness that there is a hidden enforcement
presence (i.e., investigators), (3) credible sanctions timely imposed upon a
cross-section of the regulated community, and (4) some number of severe
sanctions that have been imposed.
STATEHAZARDOUS
WASTESTUDY,supra note 20, at 5-6.
164. The enforcement strategy for the UST program recognizes the need for encouraging the states to develop innovative approaches to enforcement.
The State program approval objectives provide the States with the minimum
Standards for EPA's approval, but at the same time do not dictate the methods
States may use in meeting these standards. EPA believes this approach to State
program approval will provide the States with significant flexibility, permit
alternative methods of implementation, and still ensure that State UST programs adequately protect the environment. EPA seeks to approve a variety of
State programs and to encourage States to use innovative approaches in all
program areas.
UST COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY,
supra note 118, at 4-5. See supra note
95 and accompanying text.
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The second factor pointing to the need to re-evaluate the
federal-state enforcement roles is the failure of the heavily federalized RCRA and CERCLA programs to achieve high compliance
rates. Under RCRA, compliance rates have been consistently low.
A 1988 Government Accounting Office study found that even for
landfills, EPA's highest enforcement priority, compliance rates
were only about fifty percent.16s The study also found accurate
compliance rates were not even available for hazardous waste
treatment and storage fa~i1ities.l~~
The Superfund program has been heavily criticized for not
~ ~ of this criticism has foachieving more rapid ~ 1 e a n u p s . IMuch
cussed on the failure of EPA to utilize the enforcement tools
provided in both CERCLA and SARA.16* A 1988 report by the
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, found that "EPA's management philosophy and policies
are generally predisposed to relying on Superfund assets to execute
the program rather than requiring responsible party cleanups."lb9
The result was that in 1989 five public dollars were being expended
for Superfund work for every responsible party dollar.170 The fivepublic-to-one-private dollar ratio was in marked contrast to the
165. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HAZARDOUS
WASTE: NEW APPROACH
NEEDEDTO MANAGE
THE RESOURCE
CONSERVATION
AND RECOVERY
ACT 43 (July
.
- 1988).
166. Id. at 41.
167. See penerallv Environmental Defense Fund. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, Nat'l ~udubYon
Nat. Resources Defense council, Nat'l Wildlife Fed., Sierra Club,
U.S. PIRG, Right Train, Wrong Track: Failed Leadership in the Superfund Cleanup Program 42-54 (June 20, 1988).
168. SARA added several provisions designed specifically to encourage settlements,
including providing responsible parties with non-binding allocations of the parties' shares
of responsibility, the availability of partial government funding, and authority to enter into
separate settlements with de minimis contributors. See 42 U.S.C. 8 9622 (Supp. V 1987).
See also CLEANSITES,supra note 106, at 11-13.
169. Superfund Program Status, supra note 107, at ii. The report also observed that:

Sot.:

It is EPA's responsibility, given the legal authorities provided in the Superfund
legislation, to implement an enforcement grogram which will achieve timely,
privately-funded cleanup actions or cost recovery settlements. Thisfrmdamental responsibility was set forth in the original legislation and reinforced in
SARA. Further, the SARA legislative history makes evident that the Congress
recognized that without a highly s~cccessfulenforcemen1 program, EPA ~vould
never achieve the objectives of the Superfind legislation because EPA, by
itself, could nor secure the financial and human resources required to solve
the problem.
Id. at 8. See also Mays, Superfund Enforcement in the Dumps: What's Wrong 1villr the
Superfitnd Program?, NAT'L ENVTL.ENFORCEMENT
J., Feb. 1989, at 4.
170. See Superfund Program Status, supra note 107, at 13.
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experience reported under the enforcement-based Minnesota Superfund program, under which private funds have financed the
vast majority of cleanup work.171 A more recent study by Clean
Sites, an organization developed to help bring about settlements
with responsible parties in Superfund cases, also concluded that
the slow progress of the Superfund cleanup program was related
to EPA's failure to use aggressively its enforcement a ~ t h 0 r i t y . l ~ ~
A third factor pointing toward the need to reassess the governmental enforcement roles is the increasing demand on EPA
related to interstate and international problems. A number of interstate issues have become more important in the past few years.
These issues include acid precipitation, interstate transport of
ozone precursors, the interstate movement of air toxics, and the
interstate transportation and disposal of solid and hazardous
171. A United States House of Representatives report which examined the Minnesota
program noted that:
By December 1987, the State had categorized 20 of 130 (15 percent) sites as
having the final remedy in place. In comparison, EPA, on a national basis,
Izas completed work on only 13, or 1 percent, of the 951 NPL sites.
Minnesota's Superfund philosophy on enforcement has clearly favored
obtaining PRP's [potentially responsible parties] takeovers on hazardous sites.
For example, PRP's are conducting about 80 percent of the RyFS's [remedial
investigationlfeasibilitystudies] and about 90 percent of the RDIRA's [remedial
desidremedial actions]. Further, through June 30, 1987, PRYs have financed
about 90 percent of program costs, which total about $113 million.

Id. at 23.
172. The Clean Sites study noted that:
When the Superfund law was firs: enacted, the government intended to
use its broad enforcement authorities to require responsible parties to clean up
a sizeable percentage of the sites on the [National Priority List] . . . .
After the reauthorization of Superfund in 1986, when ample Superfund
money subsequently became available to finance site work, EPA came to rely
more extensively on Fund-financed actions. In those years, 1982-84, and 198788, when EPA reportedly had abundant money and few sites ready for expenditures, the Agency chose to spend most of the money on its own program of
site investigation and cleanup, rather than undertake the more lengthy and
expensive process of PRP identification, enforcement negotiations, and litigation leading to privately financed cleanups or cost recovery actions. Given
Clean Sites' understanding that there will be more sites ready to have work
begin by the end of 1989 than there will be Fund money available, it is clear
that the financing of additional cleanups will have to come from PRP settlements and EPA enforcement actions.
EPA's 1986-88 pattern of using the Superfund monies as a first choice
to finance response actions retarded the ultimate resolution of the site cleanup
problem.
CLEANSITES,supra note 106, at 7.
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waste. Internationally, global warming, exportation of hazardous
waste, overseas disposal of solid waste, and acid precipitation
problems are also drawing more of EPA's attention.173These interstate and international issues are likely to require an increasing
percentage of EPA's limited resources. Due to federal deficit problems, these resources are unlikely to increase in proportion to the
new demands on EPA.174
Finally, in the twenty years since the federal government
began assuming a heightened role in environmental enforcement,
many state programs have been significantly strengthened. State
budgets for environmental programs have increased substantially
since 1982, even in the face of declining levels of federal grant
assistance.
VII.

THE PRINCIPLES
FOR

ALLOCATING
ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSIBILITY

Twenty years ago, one of the main reasons for an increased
federal role in environmental protection was the inadequacy of
state programs, including state enforcement. Today, allowing
173. Indicative of the increased emphasis on international issues is the fact that the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency recently has proposed upgrading
its Office of International Activities from Associate to Assistant Administrator status. See
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2542 (Mar. 3 1, 1989).
174. See Congressional Budget Office, Environmental Federalism: Allocating Responsibilities for Environmental Protection 1, 4 (Sept. 1988) (staff working paper) (on file
with HARV.ENVTL.L. REV.).
175. The following table shows the increased state funding role in three environmental programs.'
EPA Grants a s a Percentage
Total State Budgets
(in millions of 1987 dollars)
of State Budgets

-.-

Air

250

50
Water*
40
-" Hazardous
30Waste"
20.
100
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
+

100
0
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

*Includes water quality programs; some drinking water programs may not be included,
**Includes both hazardous and solid waste programs.
Id. at 18-19.
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states and, in some cases, local governments, to reassume a greater
enforcement role may be the only way to ensure an effective
enforcement presence among the tens of thousands of regulated
entities that now exist in each state. Strong, well-focussed enforcement efforts designed to address the varying.types of regulated
entities in each state are necessary to obtain the high levels of
voluntary compliance without which the vast regulatory programs
will not succeed.
The principles articulated below are designed to assign specific
responsibilities to each level of government to avoid duplicative
efforts, conserve limited resources, minimize disruptive intergovernmental conflicts, provide greater certainty and finality in enforcement actions, and allow for flexibility and innovation to meet
the heavy enforcement responsibilities of government regulatorsin sum, to achieve more effective and efficient enforcement. Congress should apply these principles to allocate enforcement responsibilities between the states and the federal government in
enacting new environmental programs and reauthorizing existing
programs. EPA should also utilize the principles to the extent
permitted by Congress in developing enforcement policies.
A. States Should Adopt Their Own Regulatory and Enforcement
Authority to Support Federal Regulatory Programs

Most of the environmental laws reviewed in this Article require states to adopt parallel regulatory programs and to use existing enforcement authority or to obtain new enforcement ,authority in order to be delegated enforcement primacy. The
Emergency Planning Act and the Medical Waste Tracking Act,
however, provide direct federal enforcement authority to the
states. Even if states are authorized to use federal enforcement
authority directly, states should enact parallel state enforcement
authority. There are several reasons for this approach.
First, the state enforcement authority allows access to the
more numerous state courts. Second, state enforcement authority
can be more closely tailored to the enforcement needs of each
state. Third, the adoption of federal enforcement programs as state
law helps develop legislative support for the program which, in
turn, helps to make available the necessary resources to enforce
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the-law adequately. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, independent state enforcement authority may avoid federal "strings"
such as those EPA apparently is attempting to attach to the states'
exercise of federal enforcement authority under the Medical Waste
Tracking
For example, independent state authority would
avoid the problem of having to pay any assessed civil penalties to
the Federal Treasury. 177
,

B. EPA Should Ensure that a State Has Developed and Has
Authority to Implement a Reasonable Enforcement Strategy
Before Authorizing a State to Carry Out the Enforcement
Responsibility for a Federal Program
Nearly all the major environmental programs require EPA to
review the adequacy of state programs before granting enforcement responsibility to the states. The Emergency Planning Act
and the Medical Waste Tracking Act do not require EPA approval
of state programs, however. While the absence of federal approval
requirement removes the burden of this approval process from
states, EPA has little stake in a state enforcement program that it
has not reviewed and found to be adequate. The result may be
that EPA would feel unconstrained in filing an independent enforcement action. To coordinate governmental enforcement resources effectively, it is important that EPA and the states work
together to put iil place enforcement programs that allocate enforcement responsibilities clearly rather than ones that leave open
the possibility of potentially duplicative and disruptive independent enforcement actions.
States wishing to assume enforcement responsibility for a
federal program should be required to develop an enforcement
strategy for each program for which they seek authorization. The
EPA approval process should not involve a microscopic examination of state authority. In particular, it should not require states
to adopt enforcement authority and approaches that would mirror
how EPA would proceed if it were managing the enforcement
effort. Rather, the approval process should focus on whether the
176. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
177. The adoption of state enforcement authority would also avoid the possible
constitutional issues raised under the Medical Waste Tracking Act scheme. Id.
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state has developed a reasonable enforcement strategy for the
program based on the types of regulated facilities in the state and
the unique mix of statutory and common law enforcement authority available to the state.178The strategy should lay out the state
and federal enforcement authority that the state will utilize, the
personnel and other resources that will be committed to enforcing
the program requirements, the general strategy for achieving and
maintaining compliance, and the criteria for measuring progress of
the enforcement effort in obtaining compliance.
C. Once a State Program Has Been Authorized to Carry Out a
Federal Program, Most Enforcement Cases Should Be Handled
by the State Without EPA Intervention
Except for cases involving significant interstate impact and
cases that have been referred to EPA by the state, a state should
handle all enforcement cases without EPA intervention once the
state program has been authorized. While the filing of a federal
enforcement action in an authorized state may occasionally correct
an inadequate enforcement action, the consequences of initiating
a federal enforcement action, particularly an overfiling case, do
not justify the continued exercise of this authority. Federal intervention introduces, uncertainty into state enforcement programs,
results in duplicative enforcement efforts, drains the limited enforcement resources available to both the state and federal governments, often disrupts the working relationship between states
and EPA, and conflicts with the historical role of states in dealing
with local environmental enforcement pr0b1ems.l~~
Further, there are at least two types of safeguards that minimize the impact of limiting EPA enforcement authority in an authorized state. First, most of the environmental statutes authorize
citizen suits.1s0These citizen suit provisions increasingly have been
used to address cases where governmental enforcement has not
proceeded on a timely basis. Second, EPA should retain the ability
to withdraw program authorization where there has been a consis178. See supra note 95.
179. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also S. NOVIK,
THELAWOF
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
§ 6.02131, at 6-19 to -20 (1989).
180. See supra note 132.
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tent pattern of inadequate enforcement. If EPA periodically exercises the option of withdrawing state authorization when a state
has consistently failed to pursue enforcement actions, the number
of inadequate state enforcement actions should be minimized.
Finally, given the huge enforcement workload, Congress and
EPA must begin to view environmental enforcement as a true
partnership effort. While the partnership terminology has long
been used by EPA, the actual federal-state relationship has been
closer to that of a parent watching over an unreliable child than a
relationship of equals. If the federal government is to maintain a
credible enforcement program to deal with the hundreds of thousands of regulated entities, it must trust the states to do an adequate job once the states are authorized to carry out a program.
There simply are not adequate resources to approach the problem
any other way.

D. EPA Should Retain Authority to Bring Enforcement Actions
in Cases Involving Significant Interstate Pollution
States are often not in a good position to address enforcement
problems involving more than one state for several reasons. The
point of emission may be in a jurisdiction entirely separate and
possibly remote from the several jurisdictions that are likely to
experience the fallout.lS1The jurisdiction that suffers the problem
has little regulatory control over the emission. Further, the government of the place where an emission originates may have little
interest in dealing with the problem.Is2 As a result, the federal
government is in a better position to deal with enforcement matters
that involve multiple states. EPA should therefore retain enforcement authority in cases involving significant interstate pollution
impact.
Because many enforcement problems may 'involve some interstate impact, a set of criteria for determining whether a case
has significant interstate' importance should be developed by EPA
and the states. The criteria should also include a system for a state
to provide early notice to EPA about violations that have the
potential to cause significant interstate impact. Similarly, EPA
181. See 1 F. GRAD,supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-20.
182. Id. 8 1.04, at 1-22 to -23.
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should be required to notify a state of violations EPA believes
have the potential to cause significant interstate impact. Finally,
EPA should decide as early as possible in the process whether it
wishes to assume full responsibility for an enforcement action to
avoid duplicative efforts and to minimize disruptions to the state
enforcement program.

E. States Should Be Able to Refer Certain Enforcement Cases
to EPA
EPA's enforcement strategy under both RCRA and the Emergency Planning Act specifically provides for referral of cases to
EPA.Is3 If their programs have been authorized, states should be
able to handle most enforcement cases. However, the availability
of a referral process is important for a limited set of cases.
First, there may be some cases that involve complex technical
issues that EPA is better equipped to handle. Second, if a case is
extraordinarily large, a smaller state may not have the resources
necessary to carry out the enforcement action. Finally, in some
cases states may be placed in a difficult political position. For
example, if a large employer in an economically distressed area of
a state has committed serious violations, it may be difficult in
some states to proceed vigorously against the company. The ability
to refer the matter to EPA could remove the state enforcement
officials from this problematic situation.
The conditions under which a referral can be made and will
be accepted should be clearly articulated. EPA and the states
should jointly develop referral criteria.

F. Systems Used to Account for Progress in Enforcement
Should Be Based on State Enforcement Strategies and Should
Be Designed to Encourage Innovation By States
A system of accounting for the progress of state enforcement
efforts is necessary for several reasons. There is a national interest
in the enforcement of all federal environmental programs. Thus,
183. ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE
POLICY,
supra note 92, at 16; CERCLA Enforcement
Strategy, supra note 142, at 9.
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Congress has a right and an obligation to know how enforcement
efforts are proceeding under the environmental programs it has
enacted. Further, continued federal financial support of state enforcement programs is needed. EPA should be able to assess
whether the funds it is providing the states are being well managed.
Finally, states themselves should have a system of measuring progress in their enforcement efforts.
Given the vast enforcement responsibilities of the states, the
accountability system must encourage states to use all of their
available enforcement tools to achieve high compliance rates.
Thus, the system should be built from the bottom up, based on
the enforcement strategies developed in each state. This approach
contrasts with the EPA's current enforcement response policies,
particularly in the RCRA program, which tend to dictate enforcement responses from the top down, focussing on the enforcement
tools that EPA utilizes.Ig4
The accountability system could continue to establish a target
number of enforcement actions to be initiated each year. However,
these targets should be established by each state based on the
anticipated mix of enforcement tools that may be used. The state
by state numbers could then be aggregated to help measure nationwide progress for Congress. Although target numbers of en184. A study conducted by the Environmental Law Institute on RCRA enforcement
concluded that:

By focusing on how states address individual cases and by failing instead
to examine the panoply of enforcement authorities available to a state agency
to compel or leverage compliance settlement in all types of cases, as well as
how those authorities are used and have been used by the state and how they
are publicized to regulated industry, EPA has ignored that which may be the
most significant aspect of the enforcement program-i.e., the existence of a
credible, deterrent enforcement presence. Oversight should not be driven solely
by the examination of the program on a case-by-case basis, but by an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the program as an entity. The
question should not be whether the state agency has filed a particular prescribed
enforcement action within the scheduled timeframe, but whether the agency is
capable of swiftly and effectively leveraging compliance and stringent settlement orders or decrees (which include substantial sanctions) as a natural
response to the overall enforcement presence established by the state.

....

. . . [The RCRA oversight policy] instead encourages the initiation of
cases that may actually divert the agency's resources from pursuing and maintaining an aggressive credible deterrent enforcement presence throughout the
state by addressing the most pressing cases with its limited resources.
STATEHAZARDOUS
WASTESTUDY,supra note 20, at 102-05 (citations omitted).
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forcement actions may help measure short-term accomplishments,
the primary focus of the accountability system should be on industry compliance.185EPA should work with states to help develop
meaningful measures of industry compliance that could be .incorporated into state accountability systems.
Finally, the accountability system should also be used to help
identify and correct weaknesses in state programs. Annual state
meetings with EPA should address training, technical assistance,
funding and other needs that, if help were provided, could improve
the performance of the state enforcement program.

G. EPA Should Maintain a Credible Threat to Withdraw
Authority from States Whose Implementation of Federal
Programs is Consistently Inadequate

The federal laws discussed in this Article represent a consensus on the need for establishing minimum federal environmental
standards. Because of the massive workload, the flexibility of state
enforcement programs, and the traditional role of states in enforcing environmental laws, states should ordinarily be authorized to
enforce these laws if the state has an adequate enforcement program. However, if a state consistently fails to undertake adequate
enforcement actions, the federal government should reassume primary responsibility for enforcement. This authority is understand185. A Government Accounting Office report observed that EPA's RCRA enforcement strategy is based on the premise that it is more appropriate to hold enforcement
officials accountable for accomplishing activities, such as conducting inspections and taking
ACenforcement actions, than for achieving actual compliance rates. See GOVERNMENT
COUNTING OFFICE,supra note 165, at 41. The report went on to conclude that:
EPA's goal should be to achieve actual compliance and that compliance should
be used to measure the effectiveness of EPA's RCRA enforcement program.
Oversight of the inspectors and other accountability measures may be necessary to make sure that enforcement officials discover and address violations,
and a goal based on actual compliance may need to be reduced to reflect
changing requirements or the technical complexity and difficulty involved.
However, actual compliance is an important measure of performance. Otherwise, enforcement officials may have little incentive to take the types of enforcement action necessary to get facilities back into actual compliance and
deter future violations.

Id. at 43.
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ably difficult to utilize.lg6Establishing a clear set of standards for
program withdrawal, in consultation with states, would assist in
dealing with the inevitable political battles that would result from
withdrawal of federal authorization.
Under the approach suggested in this Article, EPA should be
more aggressive in withdrawing approval if there has been a consistent pattern of inadequate enforcement. By retaining and using
this authority, EPA would maintain an incentive for states to carry
out reasonable enforcement activities and preserve the integrity of
the underlying regulatory programs. While program withdrawal
would be disruptive to federal-state relationships, it nevertheless
provides an incentive for maintaining an adequate state program
and avoids the introduction of uncertainties in the enforcement
process that are inherent in concurrent jurisdiction situations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The allocation of enforcement responsibility between the state
and federal government has varied dramatically in different statutory programs enacted over the past twenty years. These variations appear to have occurred as a result of short-term environmental and resource problems rather than in response to any set
of principles concerning the appropriate role of each level of government. In the past, when the environmental enforcement workload was smaller, a clear allocation of enforcement responsibilities
was perhaps less important. Today, faced with the task of assuring
that a huge universe of regulated facilities is complying with environmental laws, neither federal nor state officials can afford the
confusion, delay, disputes, and duplicative enforcement efforts
that result when the roles of various governmental entities are not
clearly and consistently laid out. Further, after twenty years, environmental enforcement programs should now be mature enough
to be governed by a stable set of principles. Therefore, as Congress
enacts or reauthorizes environmental laws in the future, and as
EPA develops new environmental enforcement policies, they
should do so utilizing allocation principles such as those suggested
by this Article. The result will be more effective and more efficient
enforcement of our nation's environmental laws.
186. The sanction of program withdrawal has never been exercised by EPA. See S.

NOVIK,
supra note 179, f 6.02131, at 6-19.
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